When Albertans weighed referendum Questions 1 to 5, critics at home and abroad skipped the questions and went straight to the cheapest charges: racism and hostility to immigrants. In “An Immigrant Reads the Immigration Questions,” I discussed those charges and made a promise: to show how Sweden and Denmark, two countries Canadian progressives like to hold up as models, have handled the surge of migrants and asylum seekers that reached Europe over the past decade. What follows is the Swedish instalment. Denmark comes next.
On Sept. 6, 2015, Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven stood in the rain on Medborgarplatsen, a square in south Stockholm, before a crowd of about 15,000. “My Europe takes in refugees,” the prime minister said in a naïve declaration of Euro globalism. “My Europe doesn’t build walls.” Less than a year and a half later, on Jan. 28, 2017, Justin Trudeau would ape the move in a tweet.
Seventy-nine days after the rally, on Nov. 24, 2015, Löfven’s government announced that Sweden would bring its asylum rules down to the minimum allowed under European law. Temporary permits would replace permanent ones. Family reunification would shrink. Travellers would face identity checks. Border controls had already begun on Nov. 12.
What changed in those seventy-nine days? Sweden’s values held steady. The numbers moved. In October 2015 alone, 39,196 people applied for asylum in a country of fewer than ten million.
Sweden’s experience usually reaches Canadians as a fable. One version warns against naïveté, and the other mourns a lost compassion. Both skip the useful part, ignoring what the Swedes did, the order in which they did it, and with what results. The Swedes compiled most of that record themselves, and their statisticians published the unflattering numbers alongside the flattering ones. It brings back memories of a time when Canada had an independent civil service like Sweden’s.
A Consensus of Good Intentions
For about three decades before 2015, Sweden took in more refugees per resident than any other country in Europe, according to the economist Joakim Ruist of the University of Gothenburg. No party owned the policy. Governments on the right and left embraced it. The mainstream parties treated it as an element of the national character.
On Sept. 3, 2013, under a centre-right government, the Migration Board ruled that every Syrian granted protection would receive permanent residence. Sweden became the first country in the European Union to make that promise. About 8,000 Syrians holding temporary permits could now stay for good and bring their families. On the same day, the vice-chairman of a Syrian cultural association in Sweden welcomed the decision and soberly warned that it might feed the people-smuggling trade.
Less than a year later, on Aug. 16, 2014, Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt of the Moderates used a speech to prepare Swedes for more arrivals. “I know that this will cause friction,” he said. “I therefore call on the Swedish people to show patience and open their hearts.” In the same speech, he called Sweden a humanitarian superpower, Sverige über alles one might say. Barely a month later, Reinfeldt lost the Sept. 14 election. The incoming Social Democrats and Greens kept the policy.
Asylum applications steadily climbed year by year: 29,648 in 2011, 54,259 in 2013, 81,301 in 2014, and 162,877 in 2015. Of the 2015 applicants, 70,384 were children, and 35,369 of those children came without a parent. At the start of that year, the Migration Agency had planned for about 7,800 unaccompanied minors. As anticipated, smugglers were busy.
Sweden was not alone. Germany received far more people, and Hungary registered more applications per resident in 2015. Yet no country of Sweden’s size had promised so much, so openly, for so long.
What did the promise rest on? Mostly on memory. Swedes had received refugees from Chile in the 1970s and from the Balkans in the 1990s, and Löfven invoked both in his statement of government policy to the Riksdag on Sept. 15, 2015. The collective memory carried the policy forward. Alas, nobody in government had set a number, a timetable or a test of success. The policy measured itself by its intentions.
Two things attract my attention here: One is the blind reality of a country’s political elite making decisions with far-reaching implications for its social safety net and identity, without careful consideration or economic calculation of its capacity. The second, which I have seen in Canada to the same detrimental outcome, is an obtuse equating of a set of social policies with the national identity.
By late October, the Swedish government expected as many as 190,000 applications for the year. On Oct. 27, Löfven told the Nordic Council that Sweden had filled its asylum lodgings, hostels, old schools and government buildings, and was preparing to house people in tents. Gaza meets Bromma.
Intentions had met arithmetic.
Seventy-Nine Days
Progressive Canadians would be stupefied to learn that Sweden’s first correction came from the left, and it came fast. Border controls, as I pointed out above, began on Nov. 12, 2015, and the policy package of Nov. 24 followed. Monthly asylum applications fell from 39,196 in October 2015 to 2,251 in March 2016.
Sweden’s policy alone cannot explain the whole decline. Denmark and other neighbours tightened their own borders, and the European Union’s agreement with Turkey in March 2016 cut crossings over the Aegean. Swedish measures still counted because they changed the chain of expectations about what an asylum seeker would receive on arrival: a temporary permit instead of a permanent one, and a harder road for the family left behind.
Many applicants had already moved on. In January 2016, the Migration Agency reported that about 34 per cent of the asylum cases it brought to completion that month were closed because the applicants were no longer present. A full third had left. The promise of 2013 to Syrians came apart in two steps. The 2016 law ended permanent permits for most new arrivals, Syrians included, but the agency’s ruling that every Syrian qualified for protection stood until August 2019, by which time more than 100,000 Syrians had received asylum in Sweden over six years.
The Riksdag passed the temporary law in 2016 for three years and extended it in 2019 to July 2021. On July 20, 2021, amendments to the Aliens Act made the change permanent: temporary permits became the norm, and a refugee could seek permanent residence only after three years and only by meeting stricter conditions, such as supporting himself.
What the Generosity Cost
Even when they choose to ignore the reality, politicians know that every policy sends a bill. Swedish economists itemized the bill for this one.
In a 2015 study, Ruist, the Gothenburg economist mentioned earlier, estimated that the Swedish public sector redistributed about 1 per cent of GDP to refugees in 2007, and he figured that Sweden could bear the cost. In 2018, a report he wrote for the Expert Group on Public Economics, an independent committee attached to the Finance Ministry, found that refugees who arrived from the 1990s onward entered work far more slowly than those who arrived in the 1980s. Over a lifetime, the average refugee received about 74,000 kronor a year more from public budgets than he or she paid in. Ruist cautioned that the figure is uncertain because it is based on assumptions about how much refugees will earn and how much they will draw from public budgets over the decades to come.
A 2019 working paper by Ruist sharpened the point. The lifetime net contribution ranged from about minus 53,000 kronor a year for refugees from the regions whose people had historically done best in Swedish work to about minus 94,000 for those who had done worst. The spread matters more than the average. Where refugees find work, the cost falls by almost half.
Money was the smaller problem. A person who spends his first decade in a new country without work does not acquire the contacts, habits, and fluency that work provides. The employment gap shows the scale. In January 2026, 82.9 per cent of Swedish-born adults aged 20 to 64 held jobs, against 65.9 per cent of those born abroad. It is no surprise to see that unemployment stood at 3.1 per cent for the first group and 13.6 per cent for the second.
The averages hide a success that connects to my personal experience in Canada. Statistics Sweden followed the roughly 35,000 unaccompanied minors of 2015. By 2022, eight in ten of those living in Sweden had jobs, and the young men among them worked at higher rates than Swedish-born men of the same age, who were more often in university. The result suggests what Swedish institutions could achieve with young arrivals who had years to learn. The adult figures show what the same institutions could not do at the scale of 2015. The young assimilate faster and less painfully than adults.
Some newcomers keep leaving. Sweden’s population grew by only 17,800 in 2025, the smallest increase of the century. Emigration increased from approximately 34,000 people annually in the early 2000s to around 62,000 per year between 2020 and 2024, with individuals born abroad and their children accounting for 78 percent of those leaving. Where they went is only partly known. In 2024 the most common known destinations were Germany, Britain, Denmark and Norway, while 28 per cent of departures were recorded to an unknown country, largely people the Tax Agency struck from the population register after they had already gone. That clean-up also swelled the recent emigration count.
Gang violence became Sweden’s other measure of failure. Shootings reached 391 in 2022 and fell to 158 in 2025, with 43 deaths. Homicides dropped to 84 in 2025, the lowest since 2012, while bombings and extortion attacks rose.
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The Second Correction
Then came September 11. The election on that day in 2022 produced a new arrangement. The Moderates, Christian Democrats and Liberals formed a government with the parliamentary support of the Sweden Democrats, under a written pact signed at Tidö Castle. The pact went further than the stopgaps of 2015. Löfven’s government had tightened the rules to survive a crisis. The Tidö parties rebuilt the system around one principle: that entry and every right that follows it must be earned through work, self-support and good conduct. Most of that program became law in 2025 and 2026.
Work came first. Since 2008, Sweden has run one of the most open labour-migration systems in the OECD, letting employers decide which foreign workers they needed once a job had been advertised at home. Since April 1, 2025, a rejected asylum seeker can no longer switch to a work permit from inside Sweden. Since June 1, 2026, a new work permit requires a salary of at least 90 per cent of the median wage.
In March 2026, the government announced that the EU Blue Card for highly skilled workers would be valid for four years instead of two. Sweden has tightened regulations for low-wage workers while expanding opportunities for high-skilled professionals. In 2025, approximately 11,000 workers received a Swedish work permit for the first time, excluding renewals for individuals already working in Sweden. Including their family members, the total number of first work permits granted reached around 23,000.
Belonging came next. Since June 6, 2026, the general rule for citizenship is eight years of residence instead of five. Refugees, stateless people, spouses and partners of Swedish citizens, applicants under 21 and Nordic citizens qualify after shorter periods, from two to seven years, though several of those periods also grew. Applicants must also show self-support, a clean conduct record and, in stages, knowledge of the Swedish language and of Swedish society. An amendment to spare the more than 100,000 people already waiting failed by one vote, 147 to 146. Since July 12, 2026, people granted protection receive only temporary permits, while those who already held permanent residence keep it. Since Oct. 1, 2026, a resident who wants a spouse or other relative to join him must earn more to show that he can support them, must pass the same test again when the relative’s permit comes up for renewal, and in most cases must have lived in Sweden for two years first. From Jan. 1, 2027, parental benefit, child allowance and housing allowance will require five years of residence in the past fifteen, or income from work.
Conduct counts as well. A law in force since July 13, 2026 lets the state refuse or revoke a permit when a person does not lead an honest and orderly life, even without a crime. Unpaid debts, undeclared work or ties to extremist groups can suffice. Since Sept. 1, 2026, any sentence stricter than a fine can ground expulsion, and prosecutors must ask for it where the offence qualifies. Parliament also required staff at the tax, employment, pensions and social insurance agencies to report people they suspect of living in Sweden unlawfully, and it exempted teachers, doctors and social workers after criticism.
Sweden tried money too. Since Jan. 1, 2026, a refugee who chooses to return home can receive up to 350,000 kronor per adult, up from 10,000. Applications rose from 133 in all of 2025 to 763 between January and August 2026, and 200 were approved. The Migration Agency concluded from its own figures that money alone is not enough, and that advice and support before and after departure matter as much. Ruist, who led the government’s inquiry into the grant, had forecast about 700 extra returns a year and advised against the increase. The grant remains in force, but all four parties that won a majority of seats in September 2026 opposed the increase, so its future rests on who forms the next government.
The migration intake fell to levels Sweden had not seen in a generation. In 2025, 6,737 people applied for asylum, the fewest since 1996, and asylum-related immigration reached its lowest level since 1985. Grants of citizenship fell from about 65,600 in 2024 to about 38,800 in 2025, as the agency decided fewer cases while introducing new checks. Sweden still granted protection to about 12,800 first-time applicants in 2025, including Ukrainians and resettled refugees.
Reading the Numbers Honestly
Three quick cautions apply before anyone extrapolates too far from the Swedish story.
Asylum flows into Europe fell sharply after 2016, and the Ukrainians who reached Sweden after 2022 entered under the European Union’s temporary protection directive, outside the asylum count. Sweden’s 2025 figure reflects its own rules, the European trend, and the Ukrainian exception.
The employment figures describe people who arrived under the old rules. The new rules took effect in 2025 and 2026, and their effects on work will take years to show. Anyone who claims proof either way in 2026 is guessing.
The fiscal estimates rest on assumptions about future earnings, and their authors say so. They establish the direction and rough size of the cost. They cannot settle the moral question of how much a rich country should spend on protection. Voters settle that, and voters are entitled to know the price before they decide.
The Consensus Moved
The second correction has outlived the government that made it. In September 2026, Swedes narrowly voted out the centre-right coalition that wrote the strict rules, and its ally, the Sweden Democrats, lost ground. The winners did not promise to undo the work. Magdalena Andersson’s Social Democrats campaigned on keeping the strict policy, a line she had summed up in 2023 as “Strict migration: Yes. Racism: No.” Her party wants to soften some measures for people already settled in Sweden. None of the three leaders who have since sought the prime ministership offered a return to the open door of 2014.
Two months after the election, the new Riksdag, where the centre-left holds the majority, gave final approval to a constitutional amendment. It allows Sweden to strip citizenship from dual nationals for fraud, security threats or grave crimes. Coalition talks remained deadlocked in mid-November, but the policy direction was not in dispute.
The consensus has limits. A proposal to convert some 185,000 existing permanent permits into temporary ones went nowhere, and most voters opposed it. Swedes accepted stricter rules for future arrivals and balked at breaking promises already made.
In 2014 the consensus leaned toward openness, and the Sweden Democrats stood almost alone against it. By 2026 the consensus leans toward control, and the parties argue over degree. A country that once treated the question as settled by conscience alone now treats it as a matter of rules, numbers and results.
What Sweden Teaches
Six lessons follow from the record, and none depends on partisan taste.
Words set expectations. Two prime ministers in a row, one from the right and one from the left, told Swedes the country could absorb whatever came in whatever form. Their successors spent a decade lowering the expectations those speeches raised.
Sequence matters most. Sweden decided to admit before it decided how to house, teach and employ. An honest policy states its intake in advance and ties it to the things that limit integration: homes, language classes, school places, and jobs at the bottom of the ladder. Trudeau’s Canada could have learned from this experience; they may have learned about it and chose to look away.
Protection and settlement answer different questions. Protection answers danger. Settlement answers whether a person has joined the society. Sweden fused the two in 2013, granting permanent residence at the moment of protection, and spent the following decade pulling them apart. Critics argue that temporary status discourages people from investing in a country that may send them away. In my experience, that likely doesn’t happen to refugees who cannot return to their countries. The new Swedish rules offer a path in which work, language, and good conduct lead to longer status and, in the end, to citizenship.
Work is the hinge. Each new Swedish rule now runs through the labour market: the salary floor for permits, the work route around the welfare waiting period, the self-support test for citizenship. The first years in a new country set much of what follows, and Sweden’s long employment gap shows the price of letting those years drift.
Enforcement gives rules their meaning. A rule left unenforced invites the next arrival to test it. Sweden’s return grant shows the limits of incentives, since even 350,000 kronor moved a few hundred people in eight months. Removing people with no right to stay depends on quick decisions, agreements with countries of origin and supervision of those who might abscond.
Evidence must be read whole. Sweden’s statisticians published the employment gap, the fiscal estimates and the success of the minors of 2015 with equal care. A debate that hears only one of those numbers will go wrong in a predictable direction.
Canada has yet to make its own correction. For all its talk of sovereignty and identity, the country trains its alarm on words spoken across its southern border and looks away from the people who crossed that border on foot, through fields and along Roxham Road, and who are already here. Outside Quebec, Canada has fused an identity it seldom names with feel-good programs it was not prepared for and cannot afford. Blaming Justin Trudeau alone is too easy.
Trudeau left office in March 2025. In the twenty months since, his successors have slowed his policies without reversing them, and the plan for 2027 to 2029 includes a one-time measure to grant permanent residence to up to 200,000 people already in Canada.
Löfven’s sentence on Medborgarplatsen expressed a decent wish, and Sweden still honours part of it, within limits it now writes into law. The Swedes learned that a promise without a number leaves someone to break it. Usually, a successor does the breaking. Sometimes the consequences arrive so fast, or run so deep, that the author must break the promise himself. Löfven broke his seventy-nine days later. Trudeau took over nine years; in October 2024, cutting his own targets, he conceded that his government “didn’t get the balance quite right.”
Kindness that cannot say how much becomes a debt, and Sweden spent a decade paying it down. Canada is yet to fully wake up.
(A new post discussing the Danish experience will follow, before we look at the Canadian experience)




Kindness needs to be both ways. When the local citizens begin to face hardships in order to accommodate the added pressures from mass immigration, where is the kindness towards them?